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Litigating Extra-Territorial Nuisances under English Common Law and 
UK Statute. 
1 Introduction 
English nuisance law is an area of tort law that remedies interferences with the use and 
enjoyment of land in accordance with the principle of ‘good neighbourliness’.1 For many 
centuries, it has tackled pollution of air and water, with one commentator characterising it aptly 
as ‘among the earliest forms of environmental protection the world has known’.2 Every country 
has an equivalent of nuisance, but the English version is particularly important historically 
since, at the height of the British Empire, it remedied industrial-scale pollution across 40% of 
the world’s territory, often ‘supplementing’ local laws and regulations.3 Against this backdrop, 
this article examines a current problem: English judges, sitting in English courts, being asked 
to hear ‘foreign’ nuisance claims of an environmental nature.4
The focus of the discussion is the on-going extra-territorial nuisance litigation around the 
exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Ltd (SPDC) and Royal Dutch Shell (RDS)5 in the English court. The Shell nuisance litigation 
under scrutiny began with a claim brought by 15,000 members of the Ogoni People, whose 
land and livelihoods were (and continue to be) injured by oil spills associated with the 
defendant’s works in 2008 and 2009. The claim was initially brought against both RDS and 
SPDC, in respect of liabilities under English law (in the RDS case) and Nigerian law (in respect 
1  See e.g. Lord Millett, in Southwark LBC v Mills [2001] AC 1, 20 (‘Good neighbourliness, involves 
reciprocity. A landowner must show the same consideration for his neighbour as he would expect his neighbour 
to show for him’).
2 R Palmer, ‘Common Law Environmental Protection: the Future of Private Nuisance, Part 1’ (2014) 6 
International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 21. For case studies on the application of nuisance law in 
an environmental setting see B Pontin, Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection (Lawtext Publishing 2013).  
3 For example in the British Mandate Palestine case of Heller v Taasiyah Chemith Tel Aviv Co Ltd (1944) SCJ 
37, Judge Windham granted an injunction against a polluting chemical factory located near Tel Aviv. He held 
that Article 1200 of the Mejelle code – the local law addressed to nuisance - was supplemented by substantive 
English common law nuisance provisions and the equitable remedy of an injunction (at 38). Reference is made 
to a ‘long line of English cases to the effect that it is no defence to a civil action for nuisance to show that the 
benefit to the general public [of the polluting activitiy] exceeds the detriment to the plaintiff’ (at 43). See further 
David Schorr, ‘The Taasiyah Chemith Case: Pollution Law in the Palestine Mandate’,  Paper Presented at World 
Congress of Environmental History Copenhagen, August, 2009. 
4 These cases are not exclusive to England. Four Nigerians and the campaign group Friends of the Earth filed 
suits in 2008 in The Hague, where Shell has its global headquarters, seeking reparations for lost income from 
contaminated land and waterways in the Niger Delta region, the heart of the Nigerian oil industry. The district 
court in The Hague ruled that Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, must compensate one farmer, but dismissed four other claims filed against the Dutch parent 
company.  Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC, District Court of the Hague, LJN:BY9854, 
C/09/337050/HAZA 09-1580 available at:http://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-
judgment-akpan-vs-shell-oil-spill-ikot-ada-udo; Dooh v. Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC, District Court of the 
Hague, LJN:BY9854, C/09/337058/HAZA 09-1581 available at 
http://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-judgment-dooh-vs-shell-oil-spill-goi ; 
Efanga & Oguru v. Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC, District Court of the Hague, LJN:BY9850, 
C/09/330891/HAZA 09-0579  available at  http://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/bezwaren-uitspraken/final-
judgment-oguru-vs-shell-oil-spill-goi
5 Royal Dutch Shell Plc. is one of the world's largest independent oil and gas companies. Its registered office 
and place of incorporation are in the United Kingdom. lt is domiciled in the United Kingdom and  listed on the 
FTSE stock exchange.  lt is the parent company of the Shell group of companies (the "Shell Group”). 
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of SPDC), but the parties agreed that it would proceed in respect of the SPDC alone. The claim 
was settled after a hearing of preliminary issues, in Bodo People v Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd.6
Two further group claims of similarly significant proportions have subsequently been 
commenced by inhabitants from the Ogale and Bille communities respectively in 2016.7 The 
claims have been brought against both RDS at its London address and SPDC at its address in 
Nigeria, for which leave of the court to serve the claim out of jurisdiction has been sought, and 
obtained.8 On this occasion, by contrast with Bodo People, the parties have been unable to 
agree on the jurisdiction of the English court in respect of SPDC. While the claims against RDS 
are based on the party’s domicile in England,9 the jurisdiction of the English court in respect 
of the Nigerian subsidiary (SPDC) is contested. 
With so much attention being given to the ruling in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Corporation,10 in which the US Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction on the basis of a pre-
presumption against the extra-territorial application of the US Alien Torts Statute (ATS),11 it 
is easy to overlook the fact that the principles and rules relating to extra-territorial litigation are 
grounded in national legal systems, and thus may differ from country to country. Thus putting 
the breaks on the once claimant friendly12 US approach does not necessarily close the door on 
other national paths within private international law.13 It is true that US law has for some time 
been ‘the main engine for transnational human rights and the environment litigation’,14  but 
6 Bodo Community and others v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC). 
7 Lucky Alame and others y v Royal Dutch Shell plc and hell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd; 
His Royal Highness Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi and others  v Royal Dutch Shell plc and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (unreported leave decisions of His Honour Judge Raeside QC, 
Technology and Construction Court, 2 March 2016). The discussion of this emerging civil action draws on 
Claim No HT-2015-000241, Exhibit DL/1 (Witness Statement of Daniel Learner) and Claim No HT-2015-
000430, Exhibit MD/1 (Witness Statement of Martyn Day). The cases will be referred to as the Ogale and Bille
claims.
8 Ibid.
9 Article 4, Regulation (EU) No1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ 
L351/1 (Brussels I Recast).  
10 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). For commentary on the case see, among others, 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, ͚Agoƌa: ‘efleĐtioŶs oŶ Kioďel. EǆĐeƌpts fƌoŵ the AŵeƌiĐaŶ JouƌŶal if IŶteƌŶatioŶal Laǁ aŶd AJIL 
UŶďouŶd͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϭϬϳ American Journal if International Law 601. A. Grear and B. WestoŶ, ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ͚The Betrayal 
of Human Rights and the Urgency of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel  
LaǁsĐape͛ Human Rights Law Review, , 21-44
11 Although the Đouƌt left the dooƌ opeŶ foƌ those Đlaiŵs that suffiĐieŶtlǇ ͚touĐh aŶd ĐoŶĐeƌŶ͛ the United State. 
‘  MĐCoƌƋuodale, ͚WaǀiŶg Ŷoƌ dƌoǁŶiŶg: Kiobel outside the UŶited “tates͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ American Journal of 
International Law 846 -851. 
12 EǀeŶ though the ƋualifiĐatioŶ of ͚ĐlaiŵaŶt fƌieŶdlǇ͛ has ďeeŶ ĐhalleŶged ďǇ diffeƌeŶt aĐadeŵiĐs, “ee J. Dine 
͚JuƌisdiĐtioŶal aƌďitƌage ďǇ ŵultiŶatioŶal ĐoŵpaŶies: a ŶatioŶal laǁ solutioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ϯ ;ϭͿ Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment, pp. 44–69, at 45. 
13 A. J ColaŶgelo ͚The AlieŶ Toƌt “tatute aŶd the Laǁ of NatioŶs iŶ Kiobel aŶd BeǇoŶd͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ)44 Georgetown 
Journal of International Kaw, pp. 1329-ϭϯϰϲ; ‘. P. Alfoƌd ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚The Futuƌe of HuŵaŶ ‘ights LitigatioŶs Afteƌ 
Kiobel’ Scholarly Works. Paper 1063, available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1063
14 D. P. “teǁaƌt, ͚Kioďel ǀ ‘oǇal DutĐh Petƌoleuŵ Co: The “upƌeŵe Couƌt aŶd the AlieŶ Toƌt “tatute͛  ;ϮϬϭϯͿ 
107 American Journal of International Law 601 
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alternatives are available in other jurisdictions.15 This article explores the extent to which the 
Shell nuisance litigation helps elucidate an alternative national approach to questions of 
jurisdiction, based both on the rules of jurisdiction mandatory for EU member states under the 
Brussels regime16 and, more specifically, on Britain’s unique common law constitution, which, 
it is argued, differs from the US in regard to the nature and strength of the presumption against 
extra-territorial jurisdiction.  
The analysis begins with a general overview of the European Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments Regulation and common law and statutory jurisdictional rules in England and 
Wales. Attention is drawn, in the context of the traditional rules of jurisdiction to the distinction 
between claims that originate as of right (when served on a party at an address in England or 
Wales)17 and those that can only be served on the defendant at the discretion of the court (where 
leave is obtained to serve a claim on a defendant abroad). Subsequent sections examine the 
application of these general rules and principles to tort litigation bearing on the environment, 
including the Shell litigation. Section 3 considers service as of right cases – especially the ‘toxic 
tort’ cases Connelly18 and Lubbe19- where the court ruled under challenge from the defendant 
that the English jurisdiction was appropriate despite not being the forum conveniens in terms 
of satisfying the ‘ends of justice’.20 Section 4 considers recent developments in discretionary 
jurisdiction cases, including Cherney,21 and Kygyyz Mobil,22 which have been criticised on the 
grounds of exorbitant jurisdiction, but which may prove of particular relevance to private 
international nuisance claims as they show a willingness, from the English courts, to extend 
jurisdiction to cases where a fair trial would be difficult, if not impossible in the more 
convenient forum. Section 5 considers the enforceability of remedies awarded in extra-
territorial tort litigation, including the peculiar problems that are raised in regard to nuisance 
law by the fact that the primary remedy is an injunction (a coercive remedy). It is concluded 
that the English approach to allowing displacement of jurisdiction from the natural forum to an 
alternative forum where the case ‘can be more suitably heard for the interests of all parties and 
the ends of justice’23  under its traditional rules may represent a valuable ‘unilateral’ 
15 Notably in those adhering to the Brussels I Recast where claims initiated against a defendant domiciled within 
the territory of a member state will proceed.  
16 The “Brussels Regime” or ‘Brussels system’ is uses to denote provisions under ‘Brussels I Regulation’ on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters Reg. (E.C.) 
44/2001, [2001] O.J. L 12/1 and the Lugano Convention (which extends rules virtually similar to those under 
the Brussels I Regulation to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). From 10 January 2015, the Brussels I 
Regulation was replaced by the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast) [2012] O.J. L 351/1 
17 ‘England’ is used as a shorthand in jurisdiction terms for England and Wales in this article.
18 Connelly v RTZ Plc [1998] AC 854. (hereafter  Connelly)
19 Lubbe and others v Cape plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545.(Lubbe) 
20 Although the jurisdictional grounds have changed in respect of these cases by virtue of the impossibility for 
the English court of staying actions in cases where jurisdiction derives from the Brussels regime. This is 
discussed in detail in section 4.  
21 Cherney v Derikpaska [2009]EWCA Civ 849;[2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 456 (hereafter Cherney) 
22 AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC (hereafter Krygyz Mobil) 
23 Spilada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460.
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development of potentially considerable importance to transnational environmental law 
litigation.24
2. English Jurisdictional Rules in Context
The rules and principles of private international law bearing on jurisdiction in civil claims differ 
from country to country, but there are nonetheless some meaningful generalisations that can be 
made as to the normative foundation for a court hearing ‘foreign’ claims.25 One is that there 
must be a minimum territorial link between the forum country and the facts of the dispute (or 
one or more of its parties). A territorial link is necessary, so the argument goes, because 
initiating a private claim involves symbolic assertion of power on the part of the state,26 even 
if increasingly symbolic.27  This underpins the presumption against the extra-territorial 
application of the law in cases like Kiobel, where it was ruled that the human rights abuse 
allegations arising from Shell’s oil enterprise in Nigeria did not ‘touch upon and concern [US 
territory]….with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.’28 It also informs the general rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I (Recast) 
Regulation which revolve around the domicile of the defendant.29
A contrasting basis for jurisdiction, independent of and capable of rebutting the territorial 
presumption, is consent of the individuals involved.30 This is based not on state power or 
authority but on individual autonomy in the sense given clearest expression in the context of 
European political philosophy by Kant.31  The idea is that people can choose where they are to 
litigate and that the court will respect that choice as a matter of principle.  
A third basis of jurisdiction centres on the idea – again central to the Western liberal tradition 
– of rule of law.32  A key facet of this is access to justice, sometimes couched in terms of the 
right to a hearing by a fair and independent tribunal in the determination of civil rights or 
24 On unilateralism, see G. Shaffer and D. Bodansky, ‘Transnationalism, Unilaterialism and International Law’ 
(2012) 1 TEL 31. 
25  On the theoretical basis of jurisdiction, see E. Merrick Dodd Jr (1929) ‘Jurisdiction in personal actions’ in P. 
Botchers, (ed) Jurisdiction in Private International Law, (Edward Elgar, 2014)  Ch  1.  
26 According to the English traditional rules symbolic power over the defendant or his property, either through 
physical service of a summons while in the forum   or seizure of property (often land) located in the forum 
justified the basis of jurisdiction: “Whoever is served with the King’s writ and can be compelled consequently to 
submit to the decree made is a person over whom the courts have jurisdiction”. John Russell & Co Ltd v Cayzer, 
Irvine and Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 298 at 302, HL.Very few limits were established under this rule, the main ones 
involving use of deception or enticing the defendant fraudulently or improperly Watkins v North American 
Timber Co Ltd (1904) 20 TLR 534 
27 On the symbolic aspect of this, see Lord Sumption in Abela and others v Baadarani and others [2013] 1 WLR 
2043 at 2063. Lord Clarke concurred (at 2060). See discussion below in this section. 
28 Kiobel n. 10 at 1669.
29 Art. 4 Brussels I Recast: ͛“uďjeĐt to this ‘egulatioŶ, peƌsoŶs doŵiĐiled iŶ a Meŵďeƌ “tate shall, ǁhateǀeƌ 
their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.͛
30 Arts. 25 and 26 Brussels I Recast. This is developed below, in this section, in respect of the English traditional 
rules. 
31 I.  Kant, Practical Philosophy. ed. and trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
32 J. ‘az, ͚‘ule of Laǁ aŶd its Viƌtue͛, iŶ J. ‘az, The AuthoƌitǇ of Laǁ: EssaǇs oŶ Laǁ aŶd MoƌalitǇ ;Oǆfoƌd 
University Press, 1979). 
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obligations.33 This right exists in some form or another in most of the world’s constitutions and 
in some countries reference is also made to the prohibition of ‘denial of justice’, which is a 
general principle of public international law.34
In England, jurisdiction in actions in personam is determined first by the Brussels regime and, 
if the regulation does not apply, by the traditional rules of jurisdiction that in this respect are 
said to be residual.35 An important aspect of jurisdiction allocated under Brussels system is that 
a court with jurisdiction according to the provisions of the regulation cannot decline jurisdiction 
in favour of another court. This simplifies jurisdictional battles in court and provides legal 
certainty for both claimants and defendants.36
Under the Brussels regime national courts have jurisdiction over those domiciled in the territory 
of a member state.37 The determination of the defendants’ domicile is done according to the 
national law of each member state.38 In England and Wales this is done according to the 
provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 as amended by the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001.39  Corporations are domiciled in the place of their 
statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business.40 The Regulation also 
considers jurisdiction based on consent by it implicit or explicit.41 Creating a forum on the basis 
of access to justice was discussed at the time of drafting the Recast Regulation,42 but ultimately 
dismissed.43
To elaborate briefly on the consensual basis of jurisdiction, not least because of its importance 
to the Bodo People claim,44 a foreign defendant submitting to the jurisdiction of the court can 
do so many ways.45 A defendant can submit to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging 
33 Article 6.1 European Convention on Human rights (E.C.H.R.) European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213. 
UNTS 221
34 “ee  A. Adede,  ͚A Fƌesh Look at the MeaŶiŶg of the DoĐtƌiŶe of DeŶial of JustiĐe uŶdeƌ
IŶteƌŶatioŶal Laǁ͛ ;ϭϵϳϵͿ ϭϰ Can. Year. Int. Law, p. 73.  
35 A. Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 2013) pp. 110-2. 
36  The court with jurisdiction derived from the Brussels Regime cannot stay actions on the 
basis on forum non conveniens following the ECJ judgement in Owusu v Jackson [2005] (C–
281/02) E.C.R. I–1383.
37 Article 4. Brussels I Recast.  
38 Article 62 for individuals and Art 63 for companies. id. 
39 Section 9 ‘Domicile of an individual; and section 10 ‘ Seat of company, or other legal person or association 
for purposes of Article 22(2) (section 43). 
40 Art. 63. Ibid. 
41 Arts. 25 and 26. Ibid 
42 A. NuǇts ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ͚“tudǇ oŶ ƌesidual juƌisdiĐtioŶ: geŶeƌal ƌepoƌt͛. Aǀailaďle at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf at 64 
43 For a discussion on the possibility of introducing an alternative general foruŵ ďased oŶ ͚ŶeĐessitǇ͛ oƌ aĐĐess 
to justice see: Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate 
Actor’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, p 24,  at p. 32.
44 See below n 46.
45 For a discussion of common law rules on agreements on jurisdiction see,  J. Fawcett and J.M. Carruthers, 
Cheshire,  North and Fawcett’s Private International Law (14th ed. Oxford University Press, 2008), pp 383-448. 
Agreements on jurisdiction for the court of a Member State are validated by Article 25 of (Brussels I recast);  
also note Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005 of 30 June 2005. 
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service without applying for an order of the court declaring that it lacks jurisdiction,46 or by 
instructing a solicitor to accept service on his behalf.47 Parties can also, by way of contract –or 
more frequently by a clause in a contract- agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a court to which 
they are not, otherwise, amenable. This is common in international commercial transactions 
where the parties may wish to choose a neutral forum for the resolution of a potential dispute. 
If such a jurisdiction clause were to exist, the court could be persuaded (provided all the other 
factors are present) to grant service abroad on the defendant unless there is a strong reason not 
to do so.48 However, it is not possible to confer jurisdiction consensually beyond the authority 
of the court.49
What falls within the authority of the court is ultimately a matter (in the UK) for the court to 
determine, but Parliament has set out relevant provisions relating to a number of areas, 
including tort. Section 30(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 as amended 
provides that:  
The jurisdiction of any court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland to entertain 
proceedings for trespass to, or any other tort affecting, immovable property shall 
extend to cases in which the property in question is situated outside that part of the 
United Kingdom unless the proceedings are principally concerned with a question 
of the title to, or the right to possession of, that property. 
By its very nature, as a tort to land, nuisance is capable of raising issues of title and possession 
which are ultra vires the courts’ authority.50
Under English law, a distinction is drawn between claims originating as of right51 and those 
originating at the discretion of the court.52 Claims can be served as of right on a defendant that 
is present in England53 in the manner prescribed by the Civil procedure Rules.54 An English 
Company can be served at its registered office55 while a foreign company can be served either 
by making service on the person authorised to accept service on its behalf or by service to any 
46 CPR, para 11 (5) 
47 CPR, para 6.4 (2) 
48 See CPR Rule 6.20(5)(d); formerly RSC Ord 11, r 1(1)(d)(iv).  Fawcett and Carruthers, n. 45 at p 382. The 
court is also unlikely to stay an action on the grounds of forum non conveniens where there is valid English 
jurisdiction clause. . 
49 For example in cases in respect of title to foreign land, or family matters where jurisdiction fora are 
compulsory. The title issue is particularly pertinent to nuisance law (see below, n 128, and associated text). 
50 Id. 
51 See n 26 and associated text. 
52 Discussed in section 4. 
53 “Whoever is served with the King’s writ and can be compelled consequently to submit to the decree made is a 
person over whom the courts have jurisdiction” John Russell & Co Ltd v Cayzer, Irvine and Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 
298 at 302, HL
54 CPR r.6.3. Service may be made personally, or by post or by certain electronic means.
55Companies Act 2006, s 1139(1)  
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place of business within the jurisdiction.56 The procedures for service on a company of Part 6 
of the CPR cover alternative methods and places of service. 
Where a claim is served on a defendant as of right, but the domicile requirement of the Brussels 
regime is not engaged (and thus the regime does not apply), a defendant wishing to have the 
action heard in a different court must make an application to stay proceedings. The principle 
on which this application is made is that of forum non conveniens, which is set out by Lord 
Goff in The Spiliada (albeit that this is a case concerning service at the discretion of the court, 
contested by the respondent):   
The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non 
conveniens where the court is satisfied that there is some available forum, having 
competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in 
which the case may be tried more suitably for the interest of all parties and the ends of 
justice. 57
In terms of the burden of proof, Lord Goff elaborated by emphasising that ‘the burden resting 
on the defendant is not just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the 
trial, but to establish that there is another available forum which is distinctly more appropriate 
than the English forum’.58
Once that burden is discharged by the defendant, the onus then shifts to the claimant to establish 
that the English court, though not the natural forum, is the nonetheless the right forum for 
purposes of determining the rights of the parties and meeting the ‘ends of justice’.59 The ‘ends 
of justice’ may or may not have some broad similarity with the ‘public interest’ as it is relevant 
in the US case law for example.60 The English courts are concerned exclusively with the private 
interests (including rights) of the parties, rather than wider, instrumental calculations bearing 
on the public at large. In this respect the ‘ends of justice’ may have more in common with 
‘public necessity’61 applied, for example, in Canada, or forum neccesitatis62 introduced as an 
autonomous ground of jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands after the abolition of the 
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s domicile in the forum.63 Regardless, 
concentrating on the common law setting at hand, and to reiterate, the crux of the court’s 
56 South India Shipping Corpn Ltd v Export-Import Bank of Korea [1985] 1WLR 585 (CA). See also CRP r. 6.3 (2); 
Saab v Saudi American Bank [1999]1WLR 1861 (CA) 
57 Spilada  n 23 at 476. 
58 Ibid 477. 
59 The second limb of the Spiliada test.  
60 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, and  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), analyzing the 
"private interest factors" affecting the litigants' convenience and the "public interest factors" affecting the 
forum's convenience. A four step approach is used by the 11th Circuit Court as in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh 
Prod. N.A., Inc., 2009 WL 2460978, 5-6 (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2009).
61 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate Actor’ (2014) 
30 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, p 24,  at p 32.  
62 This is the case of Belgium or the Netherlands. See A. NuǇts ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ͚“tudǇ on residual jurisdiction: general 
ƌepoƌt͛. available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf at 64 
63 Spiliada n 23 at 476. 
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inquiry is justice between the parties, in a highly casuistic- fashion. In the words of Evans LJ64
the alternative forum must be ‘available in practice to this plaintiff, to have this dispute 
resolved’.65
Moving on to claims served out of jurisdiction which require leave of the court, the rules are 
set out in CPR 6.36 and Practice Direction 6B, as above. In order to serve a claim on a defendant 
out of jurisdiction, the prospective claimant must satisfy three cumulative tests.66 First, that 
they have a ‘reasonable prospect of success’;67 second, that there is a good arguable case that 
falls within the grounds of the rules;68 and third, that England is the ‘appropriate forum’.69
This latter test is fleshed out in a series of leading cases, notably by Lord Goff in The Spiliada,70
and most recently, by the Supreme Court in Cherney71  and Kyrygz Mobil.72  In general, 
concepts such as ‘appropriate’ or ‘natural forum’73 have developed in the context of torts as 
undoubtedly pointing to the forum loci delictii where events leading to the damage took place.74
However, this does not impede exceptional cases from being litigated in a place other than the 
natural forum due to the unavailability of the forum delictii in a practical or legal sense. In VTB 
Capital Plc v Nutriek International Corp & Ors75  a case concerning a tort committed in 
England between foreign parties, upon approving unanimously the application of the Spiliada
test for determining whether England was the appropriate forum the court found that Russia 
was the distinctively more appropriate forum, and thus rejected the previously held view that 
the place where the tort was committed was always and clearly the most appropriate forum.76
The English courts, it stated, will not approach a case by way of applying presumptions but 
would consider all relevant factors.  
Where leave is granted, under CPR 6.45 the claim form must include a copy translated into the 
official language of the country in which it is to be served. Here, the onus is on the claimant to 
satisfy the court that England is the right jurisdiction. As Collins explains in his history of 
English service out of jurisdiction law,77 the English courts have sometimes strongly expressed 
64 Mohamed v Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East KSC [1996]1 WLR 1483. 
65 Ibid at 1485, emphasis by the authors.  Mohamed  has been criticized as an example of the wrongful 
coalescence of the first and second prongs of the Spiliada test, L. Merrett, ‘Uncertainty in the First Limb of the 
Spiliada Test’, (2005) 54 (1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly, p  201. 
66 Roger Stewart, G. Chapman and Can Yeginsu ‘Londongrad Calling: Jurisdictional Battels in The English 
Courts’ (2014) 8(1) Dispute Resolution International, p 25, at p 26. 
67 Carvill America Inc v Camperdown UK Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 457 , para 24. 
68 Canada Trust Co v Stolzenberg (No 2) [1998] 1 WLR 547, 555–557, per Waller LJ (affirmed [2002] 1 AC 1); 
Bols Distilleries BV v Superior Yacht Services (trading as Bols Royal Distilleries) [2007] 1 WLR 12. 
69 The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436.
70 Spilada  n 23. 
71 Above n 21. 
72 Above n 22. 
73 The concept of the ‘natural forum’ was discussed in in The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436, Mac Shannon v 
Rockware Glass [1978] AC 705 and The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398 in the lead up to adoption  of forum 
(non) conveniens in England  by The  Spiliada.
74 Recently, in tort cases, by the House of Lords in Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004 HL but see 
below.   
75 [2010] EWCA Civ 808, [2013] UKSC 5. 
76 This had been left as an open question by the Albafort [1984]2 Lloyds Rep 91 and Berezovsky v Michaels
[2000] 1 WLR 1004. 
77 L. Collins, ‘Some Aspects of Service Out of Jurisdiction in English Law’ (1972) 21 ICLQ, p 656.
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a concern that the English jurisdiction is ‘exorbitant’, to such an extent that it raises delicate 
diplomatic issues relating to other sovereign nations. For example, Scott LJ in George Monro 
v American Cyanamid mentioned that: 
Service out of jurisdiction at the instance of our courts is necessarily prima facie an 
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the foreign country 
where the service is to be effected. I have known many continental lawyers of different 
nations in the past criticize very strongly our law about service out of jurisdiction.78
Words used by the courts to describe limits on the exercise of discretion to serve out of 
jurisdiction include the need for ‘considerable care’,79 ‘extreme caution’80, and ‘forbearance’,81
and ‘with discrimination and scrupulous fairness’.82 But these do not favour one or other party 
– they are about doing justice between the parties viewed in the round. And the very possibility 
of exorbitant jurisdiction being entertained affirms that the English law is willing to at least 
consider coming to the aid of a foreign claimant seeking access to justice – to a degree that is 
distinctive, and perhaps even unique. 
Lately the courts have appeared rather less cautious in the face of diplomatic delicacies than at 
certain times in the past. In Cherney v. Deripkpasa,83 there was an almost nil connection with 
England84 and yet the Commercial Court found allegations that the safety of the claimant would 
be at risk should he put foot in Russia enough to justify service abroad and thereby institute the 
jurisdiction of the court.85 Concerns with the ‘ends of justice’ in this particular case, in respect 
of Mr Cherney’s personal safety and physical integrity and of his prospect to obtain a fair trial 
in Russia were the fundamental drivers of this decision.86
Similarly, the Supreme Court ruling in AK Investment CJSC v. Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd87 appears 
to push back from some of the cautionary remarks of the courts in times past. Here, the Privy 
Council, sitting on appeal from the High Court of the Isle of Man, allowed service out of the 
jurisdiction in respect of a claim whose natural forum was in Kyrgyzstan, ‘on the grounds that 
the risk that a Kyrgyz court would deliver injustice overwhelmed the ordinary operation of the 
Spiliada test.’88 The Privy Council addressed – and rejected - the defendant’s argument that 
78 [1944] KB 432 at 437 (cited ibid p 658). 
79 Collins, above n 77, p 658
80 ibid
81 Ibid
82 ibid.
83 [2009] EWCA Civ 849; [2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 456, approving [2008] EWHC 1530 (Comm); [2009] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 333. 
84 Despite the small connection  in a detailed and carefully reasoned judgment ([2008] EWHC 1530 (Comm)), 
Christopher Clarke J found that the court had a basis for exercising its discretion to take jurisdiction since it was 
common ground that, if the relevant agreement was made, it was made in England  one of the jurisdictional 
gateways of the CPR Part 6 PD6B was engaged. 
85 See A. Briggs ‘Forum Non Satis, Spiliada and an Inconvenient Truth ‘(2011) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, p 321, at p 329 for a vigorous criticism of the decision.  
86 R. Steward, G. Chapman and C Yeginsu, “Londongrad Calling: Jurisdiction Battles in the English Courts” 
(2014) 8(1) Dispute Resolution International, p 25, at p 30. 
87 [2011] UKPC 7. 
88 Briggs n. 85, at p 27. 
10 
comity required the court not to pass judgment on the adequacy of another state’s courts (in 
that case Kyrgyzstan): 
The true position is that there is no rule that the English court…will not examine the 
question whether the foreign court or the foreign court system is corrupt or lacking in 
independence. The rule is that considerations of international comity will militate 
against any such finding in the absence of cogent evidence.89
While Cherney and Kyrgyz Mobil have been criticised as exorbitant,90 there is clearly a tension 
between comity and the ‘ends of justice’, which they courts address on a fact sensitive, casuistic 
basis (rather than with bright line rules of inclusion or exclusion). 
In Abela v Baadarin91 – where the main issue was the mode and timing of service out of the 
jurisdiction - a new language to qualify the Courts’ powers in extraterritorial cases was 
suggested by Lord Sumption. The defendant in this case resided in Lebanon, which is neither 
a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 1965,92 nor a party to any bi-lateral convention on 
service of judicial documents and the trial judge had allowed service abroad on an alternative 
method – at the address of the defendant’s solicitor. The Supreme Court held that the judge had 
been right under CPR r. 6.15(2) (to retrospectively permit service by an alternative method of 
a claim form on the defendant in Lebanon) on the basis that it was considered that there was a 
‘good reason’ to make the order. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision to 
serve on the basis that it would ‘make what is already and exorbitant power still more 
exorbitant’.93 The Supreme Court restored the finding of the trial judge on the basis that the 
language of ‘exorbitancy’ was old fashioned and unrealistic. Lord Sumption gave a number of 
reasons why it ‘should no longer be necessary to resort to the kind of muscular presumptions 
against service out [of jurisdiction] which are implicit in adjectives like “exorbitant”’.94 Among 
those changes are that extraterritorial litigation ‘is a routine incident of modern commercial 
life’,95 together with (and reflected by) the growing number of multilateral agreements for 
cooperation in civil matters beyond commercial ones.96
But the trend towards liberal exercise of discretion to serve out of jurisdiction should not be 
overstated. The court in Cherney went to some length to clarify that it was not passing general 
judgment on the Russian legal system or its standards of administration of justice. Indeed, the 
same judge, Lord Clarke, distinguished the decision (to which he had contributed) in Yugraneft 
v Abramovich,97 by holding a fair trial was possible in Russia between different parties and on 
different facts. Some subsequent cases where the claimant has sought to establish the 
89 Kygyz Mobil, 1830. 
90 A. Arzandeh “Should the Spiliada Test Be Revised?” (2014), 10 (1) Journal of Private International Law, p 
89, at p 90.  
91 Abela and others v Baadarani and others [2013] 1 WLR 2043.  
92 In force 10 Feb 1969 available at  https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=17
93 Cited by Lord Clarke in Abela, n 91in relation to Longmore LJ in the Court of Appeal. 
94 Above n 91, at 2063. Lord Clarke concurred (at 2060). 
95 Id. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613. 
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jurisdiction of the English courts and discard that of the ‘natural forum’ based on considerations 
of the ‘ends of justice’ have been dismissed by the English court on the basis that a case has 
not been made out that justice is likely to be denied locally.98
On the face of things, the debate arising from Cherney, Krygyz Mobil echoes somewhat that a 
few decades ago surrounding Lord Denning’s expansionist dictum in the Court of Appeal in 
The Atlantic Star: 
No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in vain. The right to 
come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends to any friendly foreigner. He can 
seek the aid of our courts if he desires to do so. You may call this ‘forum shopping’ if 
you please, but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in both for the quality 
of the goods and the speed of service.99
Yet the judgments in Cherney and Krygz Mobil are arguably of a different, nuanced, order. In 
neither is there a glib invitation to forum shop in England. The English court is not accepting 
jurisdiction on the basis that its justice process is the world’s best (as conveyed by the cliché 
‘Rolls Royce’ justice). 100. Rather, it is accepting jurisdiction because the common law 
recognises a fundamental right to a fair hearing vesting in anyone who persuades the English 
court that a hearing is impossible locally.101 The ruling can, in this way, be considered 
consistent with the principle of legality, which found influential expression in the writing of 
Dicey.102
Indeed, it probably no coincidence that A V Dicey is the author of the leading late Victorian 
private international law (Dicey preferred ‘conflict of laws’) text,103 published a decade after 
his seminal constitutional study.104 Dicey the ‘constitutional lawyer’ wrote that ‘Our 
constitution, in short, is a judge-made constitution, and it bears on its face all the features, good 
and bad, of judge-made law.’105 With specific reference to the right to access to justice and to 
other common law rights, Dicey wrote that these are defined and enforced by the judiciary, on 
the basis that they are the source of the constitution.106 Dicey compared this with codified 
98 Erste Group Bank A G (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2013] EWHC 2913. Similar conclusion was 
reached in respect of Ukraine in Pacific International Sports Club Ltd v Soccer Marketing Ltd [2009] EWHC 
1839 (Ch) and Ferrexpo AG v Gilson Investment [2012] EWHC 721.     
99  [1973] 1 QB 364, 381-382. 
 Lubbe n. 19 at 1455
101  Briggs n 85 at 330, stresses that the English courts ‘aside from egregious examples where the facts needed 
no commentary [h]ad gone out of their way to discourage litigants who, having no other cards to play, sought to 
resist a stay or to obtain permission to serve out on the basis that the relevant foreign jurisdiction was dreadful 
and not to be trusted. 
102 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edition (Macmillan, 1915). 
103 A V Dicey, A Digest of the Laws of England with particular reference to Conflicts of Laws (Stevens and 
Sons, 1896) 
104 Above n. 102 
105 Dicey, ibid, p 116. 
106
Ibid, p 119-120 (The fact, again, that in many foreign countries the rights of individuals, e.g. to personal 
freedom, depend upon the constitution, whilst in England the law of the constitution is little else than a 
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European constitutions, in which the code was the positive source of rights (such that these 
rights could be limited or extinguished through reform to the code). Owing to their primordial 
or at least foundational status under Diceyan theory, they cannot be taken away by legislation 
without a’ revolution’.107
Dicey did not elaborate on the ‘good and bad’ of this idiosyncratic constitutional arrangement, 
but some of it is obvious. What is ‘good’ about the arrangement is its responsiveness to 
individual circumstances. That is what the claimants in some (but not others) of the jurisdiction 
cases above discovered to their advantage. What is ‘bad’ is that the law lacks predictability –
again, something that chimes well with the case law above. Thus, whilst Krygyz Mobil does 
appear to provide minimally clear guidance as to the onus being on the foreign claimant to 
satisfy the court that the natural forum cannot give them a hearing, cases of this kind will 
necessarily turn on their merits, where the margins will, invariably, be fine. 
A further way in which the constitutional context of English private international law is 
illuminating concerns the role played by leave of the court in both public law (judicial review) 
and private international service out of jurisdiction claims. Claimants seeking to hold a public 
authority account in terms of the rule of law, by way of judicial review, cannot bring a claim 
as of right. They must first obtain the permission (leave) of the court for a full hearing. The 
permission hearing is usually an ex parte process that answers to the need for the court to 
establish that the claimant standing to bring a claim and that there is an arguable case on the 
merits.108 The overwhelming majority of claims fall at this leave hurdle, but nonetheless leave 
serves the important function of affording access to a court, whilst filtering out ‘weak’ claims, 
whose hearing would unnecessarily add to the difficulties and complexities of government. In 
a private international law context, leave has the same function, except that it touches also on 
relations between, as well as within, sovereign nations. 
3 Extraterritorial Tort Claims: Jurisdiction ‘As of Right’
 Claims served as of right on the defendant109 can be contested by the defendant making a case 
as to why the proceedings should be stayed110 (claims served at the discretion of the court, on 
the initiative of the claimant, are considered in the section following). Although the discretion 
of the court and scope for staying actions has been firmly restricted by the ruling of the ECJ in 
Owusu v Jackson,111 where after a decade of ambiguous decisions regarding the ability of 
English Courts to stay actions commenced as of right in England, when the alternative forum 
generalisation of the rights which the Courts secure to individuals, has this important result. The general fights 
guaranteed by the constitution may be, and in foreign countries constantly are, suspended.’
107 Ibid. 
108 OŶ judiĐial ƌeǀieǁ P. Cƌaig, ͚The CoŵŵoŶ Laǁ, “haƌed Poǁeƌ aŶd JudiĐial ‘eǀieǁ͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ Ϯϰ ;ϰͿ Oxford J 
Legal Studies, pp. 237-257. 
109 According to the criteria mentioned above in section 2, above. 
110  According the principles established by Lord Goff in The Spiliada n 23. 
111  Id. 
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was a non-Brussels country,112 it was clarified that English courts can still stay actions when 
the defendant is not domiciled in a Brussels state and service has been effected as of right, for 
example, on a foreign company not domiciled but present in England.113
Our discussion in this section draws on ‘toxic tort’ cases that today could not be subject to the 
same jurisdictional challenges, as they could not now be stayed due to the EU domicile of the 
parent company. These cases are Connelly and Lubbe, in which the English domiciled 
defendants sought a stay on proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens (under The 
Spilliada ruling). However, these cases remain highly pertinent to the discussion of the ongoing 
Shell litigation. In particular, they contain guidance on the ‘ends of justice’ test as it is applies 
to the exercise of any discretion the court has to hear tort claims with a foreign dimension.  
In Connelly,114 the claimant (domiciled in Scotland) alleged injury whilst working in a uranium 
mine in Namibia operated by a South African registered company Rossing Uranium Ltd 
(R.U.L.). The company was a subsidiary of English-registered RTZ plc. The claimant pursued 
the parent company alleging that it was negligent in devising of the subsidiary company’s 
health and safety policy. The defendant sought a stay of proceedings within the framework of 
the forum non conveniens principle set out in Spiliada. Delivering the lead judgment, Lord 
Goff noted that the reason for the choice of parent company as a defendant over the subsidiary 
was that the claim could thereby originate as of right, and thus the onus fell on the defendant, 
if it wished, to establish that the claim should be stayed for want of appropriate forum.115The 
critical attraction of the English civil justice system was the availability of a firm of solicitors 
who were prepared to undertake the claim on a no win no fee basis. 
No doubt their [the defendant’s] domicile in this country, coupled with the availability 
of financial assistance here, has encouraged him [the claimant] to select them as 
defendants in place of R.U.L. But I cannot see that that of itself exposes the plaintiff to 
criticism. If he was going to sue these defendants, this was an appropriate jurisdiction 
in which to serve proceedings on them. It is then for the defendants to persuade the 
court, as they are seeking to do, that the action should be stayed on the ordinary 
principles of forum non conveniens.116
The court held that the defendant had discharged the first stage of The Spiliada test: a Namibian 
court was the appropriate forum, as it was the forum where the injury was alleged to have been 
suffered, and many of the allegedly tortious acts causing the injury done. The onus then 
switched to the claimant to establish that ‘substantial justice cannot be done in the appropriate 
forum’.117 The lack of availability of legal aid and other assistance in Namibia was not in itself 
enough to ‘oust’ the natural forum, but it became so when situated in the wider context of the 
112 In Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [ϭϵϵϬ] ϰ ALL E‘ ϯϯϰϳ, the Couƌt of Appeal held that ͞aŶ EŶglish Đouƌt Đould 
stay proceedings brought against an English domiciled defendant when the court was convinced that a non-
ĐoŶtƌaĐtiŶg state ǁas ĐleaƌlǇ the ŵoƌe appƌopƌiate foƌuŵ͟.
113 See Section 2, above. 
114 Above n. 18. 
115 Connelly 873 
116 Ibid 873 
117 Ibid. 
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legal and evidential complexity of the claim. The House of Lords agreed with Lord Bingham 
MR’s analysis in the Court of Appeal that the court was faced with ‘stark choice’ between a 
natural forum where there never could be a hearing and one which, whilst ‘not the most 
appropriate’, made a hearing is possible.118
Lord Hoffmann added however the qualification that he would not have found for the claimant 
were it not for the fact that the claimant was no longer resident in Namibia. He doubted that a 
Namibian, or a Scotsman residing in Namibia, had a ‘legitimate expectation’ to sue an English 
company in England in respect of injury sustained in Namibia.119 However, that does not 
appear to have been supported by other Law Lords, nor was it followed in Lubbe (considered 
below).120 In that case 3000 South African-resident workers in the asbestos mining industry 
were able to sue in England, notwithstanding that South Africa was the appropriate forum. 
In Lubbe, like Connelly, the claimant’s choice of forum was driven by the practical 
consideration of the availability of legal expense support in England. The court was provided 
by the claimant with evidence of a ‘clear, strong and unchallenged view of the [South African] 
attorneys….that no firm of South African attorneys with expertise in this field had the means 
or would undertake the risk of conducting these proceedings on a contingency fee basis.’121
There was further evidence, to which the court attached some weight, that the South African 
civil justice system lacked the experience with ‘group proceedings’ that the English system 
had.122
Applying this to the post Brussels Regulation regime, the inability of the court to stay an action 
commenced against a defendant domiciled in a Brussels Regulation state enabled the 
Trafigura123 and Monterico124 litigations to proceed without the habitual jurisdictional 
battles.125  Likewise, in Bodo People a claim was brought against both RDS and Royal Dutch 
Shell and Shell Petroleum Development Corporation Nigeria Ltd.126 Part of the attraction of 
suing Royal Dutch Shell was that, as a company domiciled in England according to article 60 
(1) of the Regulation, it enabled not only the claim to be served as of right on the parent 
company at its English address, with service at this address on the Nigerian subsidiary, but 
118 Ibid, 8 (‘Faced with the stark choice between one jurisdiction, albeit not the most appropriate in which there 
could in fact be a trial, and another jurisdiction, the most appropriate in which there never could, in my 
judgment, the interests of justice would tend to weigh, and weigh strongly, in favour of that forum in which the 
plaintiff could assert his rights.’ (per Bingham MR)).
119 Ibid 876. Connelly was received with dismay by the business community, see ͚‘T) ‘uliŶg ThƌeateŶs otheƌ 
MultiŶatioŶals͛ FiŶancial Times (London 25 July 1997), and the Lord Chancellor proposed legislation to reverse 
the effeĐt of the House of Loƌds͛ ƌuliŶg, “ee ‘. MeeƌaŶ, ͚Toƌt LitigatioŶ agaiŶst MultiŶatioŶal CoƌpoƌatioŶs foƌ 
Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the UŶited “tates͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϯ:ϭ City University of 
Hong Kong Law Review,  pp 1–41, at 28 for a discussion of this case.
120 n 19. 
121 Ibid 1559. 
122 Ibid. 
123 The Trafigura Đase foƌ ǀiĐtiŵs of toǆiĐ ǁaste duŵpiŶg iŶ Côte d͛Iǀoiƌe ǁas atǇpiĐal iŶ this ƌespeĐt as it 
involved the UK head office company itself and no subsidiary. Yao Essaie Motto& Ors v Trafigura at 28 BV 
HQ06X03370.
124 Guerrero & Ors v Monterrico Metals Plc HCMP 1736/2009. 
125 For a discussion of both, Meeran n. 119. 
126 https://www.leighday.co.uk/International-and-group-claims/Nigeria/History-of-the-Bodo-litigation. 
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also, unless SPDC could prove that there was no merit on the claim against the parent 
company,127 the claim against it could not be stayed on the grounds on forum non conveniens.  
In the event, the Bodo People litigation proceeded on the agreement between the parties that 
the subsidiary company would submit to the English forum on condition that the local Nigerian 
law was applied and that the claim against RDS was abandoned. 
The concern with the tort of nuisance – a tort to land – meant that the High Court at the trial on 
preliminary issues of law in Bodo People was invited to rule on the statutory exclusion of 
jurisdiction over questions of title to, or right to possession of land outside the UK. In Polly 
Peck it was held that whether a question was principally one of title was a matter of fact and 
degree.128 The judge in Bodo People ruled that this could not be resolved at a preliminary stage, 
but nevertheless the judge offered guidance as to the kind of facts which might lead to some of 
the claims might be precluded from being heard on this basis these include a dispute over 
whether the claimant was a tenant of land, and also the extent of a bailwick of a chief, king or 
headman suing in a representative capacity.129 Judge Akenhead hinted that some of the claims 
would have failed on this point, had the case not be settled after the preliminary issue hearing. 
A further noteworthy feature of the Bodo People judgment and the subsequent cases of Bille
and Ogale is that of the substantive applicable law.  In Bodo the English court applied Nigerian 
law as agreed by the parties.130 Part of the preliminary hearing thus involved determination of 
what the Nigerian law was. The judge heard expert evidence of the correct interpretation of 
Nigerian law by two Supreme Court judges, one for the claimants (Justice Oguntade) and one 
for the defendant (Justice Ayoola). Understandably, the judge expressed ‘trepidation’ at points 
where he disagreed with each of these experts.131 Even if the parties hadn’t agreed on the 
applicable law it is likely that the court would have applied Nigerian law to the conduct of 
SPDC for acts taking place in Nigeria, pursuant to sections 11, 12 and/or 14 of the Private 
lnternational Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995132 for acts and omissions that occurred 
between 1 May 1996 and 11 January 2009, and pursuant to Articles 7 and/or 4 and/or 26 of the 
Rome II Regulation133 for acts and omissions occurring after 11 January 2009.134
To conclude this section for claims against companies domiciled in the EU it is now much 
simpler to bring a case in the courts of any member state without fear of protracted forum non 
conveniens jurisdictional battles. The remaining issues in such cases, and in those involving 
non EU domiciled co-defendants like Bodo, Ogale and Bille is on the determination by the 
court that there is merit on the claim against the European domiciled (parent) company and that 
this has not been brought up with the sole aim of suing the foreign domiciled subsidiary as a 
127 As SPDC Nigeria tried to alledge in Oguru, Efanga & Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Shell 
Petroleum Development Co Nigeria Ltd No. 330891/ HA ZA 09-579 2009. 
128 Re Polly Peck International plc (No 2) [1998] 3 All ER 812, 828 (per Mummery LJ). 
129 Bodo People [165]
130 Ibid.  
131 Bodo People, n 1, at [179]. 
132
133
134 This, ǁill also ďe the Đase foƌ the Ogale aŶd Bille Đases … DaŶiel Leadeƌ Witness Statement
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co-defendant or necessary or proper party.135 For cases brought as of right against companies 
who are present but not domiciled for the purposes of the Brussels regime the English court 
still retains the ability to stay such cases on the grounds of forum non conveniens. 
4 Extra-territorial claims at the discretion of the Court 
As noted above, the Bodo People case eventually proceeded in the High Court consensually. 
By contrast, the SPDC in the most recent cases, involving the Ogale and the Bille communities, 
has contested the High Court’s jurisdiction. In a landmark (but as yet unreported) ruling, on 
the 2 March 2016, leave was granted for these latest claims to proceed against Shell Nigeria 
Ltd.136 These are the first occasions on which nuisance proceedings have been originated at the 
discretion of an English court.  
In the absence of a reported leave decision, it is difficult to comment on the reasoning of the 
court in granting leave. However, as explained above, there are well established principles 
regarding meeting the ‘ends of justice’ within the forum non conveniens test that are capable 
of displacing the natural/local forum (Nigeria). One consideration is whether the Nigerian 
courts are any better equipped than South African ones (in Lubbe) to hear a complicated group 
claim,. Nigerian legal practitioners would prima facie struggle to pursue a contingent fee claim 
on the scale of Bodo People with confidence, as the court acknowledged would be a problem 
in relation to South African legal practice (in Lubbe). If so, the Ogale and Bille communities 
in this new phase of Shell extra-territorial nuisance litigation did not (so the argument may go) 
‘choose’ the English court jurisdiction over the local court jurisdiction; rather, the choice in 
these circumstances was between having a hearing or not.137
It is helpful to reflect on the specific nature of the local obstacles to access to justice that could 
in principle justify extra-territorial jurisdiction in these and similar future circumstances. 
Rather than rely on broad notions of ‘obstacle’, a pertinent distinction can be drawn between 
impediments to access to justice based on ‘technical’ considerations (concerning fee, group 
claim and other arrangements concerning the administration of civil justice), and those of a 
more ‘political’ character (concerning discrimination and/or corruption in the national justice 
regime). The former describes the situation in Connelly and Lubbe (above), where the court 
attributed considerable weight to the absence of local availability of financial assistance (in 
Connelly)138 and the capacity to handle a complex group claim (in Lubbe).139 The latter 
describes the situations in Cherney140 and Krygyz Mobil.141 The ‘technical’ and the ‘political’ 
obstacles to ‘ends of justice’ argument are not mutually exclusive, but the distinction is, 
nevertheless, important. The latter more deeply engages the principle of comity, in the sense 
135
136 Above n   [insert order no]
137 Bingham MR in Connelly, above n 131.
138 Ref- to para in Connelly
139 As above
140
141 And similar cases like Altimo Holdings and Yugranef 
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that it is one thing to say that a foreign civil justice regime lacks the technical competence of 
some of the world’s most experienced regimes and another thing altogether to say that it is, 
sometimes, corrupt. 
Applied to the Ogale and Bille Kingdom claims, evidence is being put forward by the 
claimants’ legal representatives which covers both kinds of obstacle. In regard to technical 
obstacles, the following passage from a witness statement is illustrative: 
Most of the Claimants in this case are poor, rural Nigerians who live as subsistence 
farmers or fishermen. As a result, it may well be difficult for them to obtain suitably 
qualified legal representatives. There is no legal aid available in Nigeria for claims of 
this nature, which means that there is a stark inequality in resources between the 
Claimants and the Defendants in this case. Whilst claims of this nature can sometimes 
be funded using damages-based agreements or similar types of agreement, many 
Nigerian lawyers will additionally require payment whilst a case is progressing, 
including for drafting submissions or attending hearings. This is particularly true where 
a case is complex or where the lawyer is required to attend court frequently.142
Further, it is alleged that the civil justice system is subject to lengthy delays. In SPDC v Tiebo, 
for example, the Nigerian Supreme Court in 2005 handed down judgment 17 years after 
proceedings were started.143
At a political level, the obstacles centre on a deep distrust of the local civil justice regime as 
propping up the nation’s ‘oil oligarchy,’144 which was at the forefront of the US litigation in 
Wiva,145 the unsuccessful litigation in Kiobel,146 the Bodo People claim, and is, again, 
resurfacing in the context of the Ogale and Bille nuisance litigation. Thus, in the witness 
statements reference is made to ‘state interference in the course of justice’147 that includes ‘a 
widespread belief…that the Nigerian judicial system is vulnerable to interference and 
corruption.’148
Cutting across the technical-political distinction is a delicate issue of international relations 
concerning the labelling of shortcomings in local justice in a foreign (in this case English) 
court. Muchlinski makes a salient point in connection with the removal of the Bhopal claim 
from the US to the Indian court system, that ‘an admission by the home country [the US] that 
the host country is the better forum may give legitimacy to host country controls over the 
142 DL/1, above n 7 m para 44(b)(i).
143 Ibid, para 44(b)(iv).
144 S. Joab, D. Peterside, & M. Watts (2012) Rethinking Conflict in the Niger Delta:. Understanding Conflict 
DǇŶaŵiĐs, JustiĐe aŶd “eĐuƌitǇ͛. WoƌkiŶg papeƌ Ŷ Ϯϲ.  Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/Watts_26_Revised.pdf 
145 Wiwa et al v Royal Dutch ef a/ (No. 96 Civ. S386 (KMWXHBP)), the claimants sought damages from the Shell 
Group's parent companies for human rights abuses, including their involvement in the deaths of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and other Ogoni activists. The claim was settled. 
146 Above  n 10
147 D/L, above, n 7 para 44(b)(iii) 
148 Id.
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firm’.149 A corollary of this is that a show of confidence in the local regime – say the Nigerian 
justice system – can in principle help it improve and develop resilience. Indeed, whether the 
argument centres on technical or political obstacles to justice, the courts are necessarily 
engaging with a field beset with complex international political considerations. Again, 
Muchlinski captures this well in commenting that judges in this setting are never dealing 
narrowly with ‘a formal system of rules but a system of national policy implementation…Even 
where the judges do not intend it, decisions on jurisdiction will be read as political acts’.150
The Shell nuisance litigation, and in particular the granting of leave in respect of the Ogale and 
Bille community claims, will undoubtedly offer considerable encouragement to individuals in 
other parts of the world who are victims of industrial nuisance in similar circumstances to the 
Niger Delta. Nigeria, prior to independence in 1963, was a British Protectorate (and before that 
a territory annexed to Britain).  It was under British rule that oil exploitation commenced, and 
with it Shell’s involvement in the region.151 This has remained in the background of the 
nuisance litigation, as has the fact that, after independence, opposition from local farmers and 
fishermen to Shell’s enterprise escalated.152 The suppression of this opposition by Shell and 
the Nigerian state prompted human rights abuse claims brought before the US courts on the 
basis of the Alien Torts Statute (Wiva v Shell153 and Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Corporation).154
In Palestine, like Nigeria a former British protectorate, the politics of occupation by Israel and 
the design of the legal system make access to the local courts by Palestinian nuisance victims 
as complex, due to the historical and political settings, as those faced by the Ogoni communities 
in Nigeria. There are multiple layers to private international law in the setting of 
Israel/Palestine.155 Under the terms of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, service of a nuisance 
claim in a Palestinian court on an Israeli-resident defendant requires the consent of that 
defendant.156  According to Israeli private international rules, a claim against the works 
(assuming the proprietors withheld consent to proceed in the Palestinian courts) can proceed in 
the Israeli High Court of Justice157 but, understandably, that may not be the forum in which 
Palestinians wish the action to be heard. Not only is there a perception among the local 
Palestinian population of institutional bias in favour of Israeli parties – which may or may not 
be justified - but there is also a reluctance to endorse one or more of the institutions of the 
belligerent occupying force (the Israeli national courts) by invoking its civil justice machinery. 
149 Above n. 58 p. 580. 
150 Ibid, p 581
151 J. G. FƌǇŶas, ͚PolitiĐal IŶstaďilitǇ aŶd BusiŶess: FoĐus oŶ “hell iŶ Nigeƌia͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ϭϵ Thiƌd Woƌld QuaƌteƌlǇ ϰϱϳ
152 Joab et al. n 150. 
153 Wiwa et al v Royal Dutch ef a/ (No. 96 Civ. S386 (KMWXHBP)), the claimants sought damages from the Shell 
Group's parent companies for human rights abuses, including their involvement in the deaths of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and other Ogoni activists. This claim was 
154 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
155 M Karayanni ‘Access to Justice Ascends to International Civil Litigation: The Case of Palestinian Plaintiffs 
before Israeli Courts’ (2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 41. 
156 Oslo Accord, Annex 4.  Karavanni, id at 52.  
157 T Kelly, Access to justice: the Palestinian legal system and the fragmentation of coercive power (LSE, Crisis 
States Research Centre Working Papers Series 1, 2004) p 41. 
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As one commentator has remarked, litigation of tort claims involving Israeli defendants, before 
the Israeli courts, can sometimes be interpreted as ‘legal laundering’, by clothing Israeli 
occupation ‘in a cloak of legality’.158
In recent years a Palestinian human rights organisation called Al Haq has been gathering 
witness testimony of victims of industrial nuisances with a view to bringing a claim in an 
‘international’ or extraterritorial tort action, possibly before the English courts. One of the most 
high profile industrial nuisance allegations centres on the Geshuri agrochemical works in 
Tulkarm.159 The works used to be located on the Israeli side of the border, but they were 
relocated into occupied Palestine as a consequence of complaints by Israeli neighbours (who 
sued the company in nuisance in the local court in Israel).160 When relocated to the Palestinian 
side of the border, the Israeli owners undertook not to operate the works when the wind blew 
in the direction of Israeli territory. In effect, the works operates only when the wind keeps its 
pollution within the Palestinian border. As a consequence, it is alleged that the locality is a 
hotspot of cancer, asthma, eye and respiratory health anomalies.161  . 
There are some obvious difficulties for a claimant in these circumstances (against a defendant 
not present within the jurisdiction or who is not a ‘necessary and proper party’ to an action 
against a defendant domiciled or present within the jurisdiction162) to obtain permission to serve 
the claim out of jurisdiction, and thus this case study is helpful in fleshing out some of the 
potential limits on the courts discretion in the present subject matter.  The first of such problems 
is the fundamental issue of whether in the absence of one of the grounds or gateways for service 
out of the jurisdiction163 the English (High) Court would be prepared to allow service out of 
the jurisdiction on a foreign defendant, for a wrong committed abroad, purely on the basis of 
the common law of natural justice.164 If that, by no means small, hurdle is to be successfully 
negotiated it will have to be on the basis of the unconscionability of having the case heard in 
Israel within a court lacking legitimacy in the context of belligerent occupation.165 The second 
hurdle lies in the distinction between the technical and political grounds that the court will 
consider when establishing whether the ‘ends of justice’ should displace the natural territorial 
forum. Either way there are challenges. The Israeli High Court of Justice is highly respected 
worldwide for its judicial professionalism, independence and impartiality. As such it would 
159 D. Qato and R. Nagra, ‘Environmental and public health effects of polluting industries in Tulkarm, West 
Bank, occupied Palestinian territory: an ethnographic study’ (2013) Lancet, vol 382, p 5, S29. B. Pontin, V. de 
Lucia, J. Gamero Rus, Environmental Injustice in Occupied Palestinian Territory (Al Haq, 2015), 79-80. 
160 Pontin at al. id at 79-80 
161 Qato and Nagra, n 82. 
162 See section 2 above for an overview of ordinary jurisdiction grounds. 
163 It is important to remember that those were present in Cherney and in Kyrgyz Mobil. It is noteworthy 
however, the reflection advanced by Prof Briggs that if what drives the court to allow service out is the fact 
that England is the forum conveniens the requirement to satisfy taxonomic gateways is unjustified. Briggs, n.85 
at 123. 
164 If it did, it will amount to the doctrine of  forum of necessity.  
165 What Cherney and Kyrgyz Mobil have shown is that the claimant must establish the risk of injustice (in the 
sense of lack of a fair hearing) at a specific level. It is not enough to prove that there is a general risk of 
corruption, incompetence or irrational decisions in the foreign forum.  
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appear to be difficult for the English court to be persuaded that the Israeli court would deny the 
Palestinian claimants a fair hearing. Equally, in Israel there are opportunities for affordably 
funding a large group nuisance claim.166
Thus the outcome of Ogale and Bille is of far reaching significance. It will further illuminate 
the English court willingness to take on extraterritorial nuisance claims. Whether ‘necessity’ 
or ‘the ends of justice’ can operate as autonomous drivers to facilitate service abroad in the 
absence of one of the existing jurisdictional gateways remains to be seen.  
5. Enforcement of Nuisance Remedies in English Private International Law 
The potential enforcement of the court judgement forms an integral part of the forum selection 
by the parties in private international law cases. In a tort setting much depends on what 
remedies are sought. Nuisance remedies are particularly complex, for whilst they share many 
of the characteristics of tort remedies more generally, notably damages of a compensatory 
nature, there are differences of considerable importance from a private international law 
perspective. In particular, what Lord Goff called the ‘primary remedy’ in nuisance proceedings 
is not damages, but an injunction.167 The function of an injunction in this context is to put an 
end to an on-going civil wrong involving the use of land. In other words, an injunction requires 
the wrong-doer to use land ‘rightly’. If they fail to do so, the claimant can bring a claim for 
contempt of court. In the context of foreign territory, it is hard to imagine how an English court 
could police a nuisance injunction without risking a diplomatic crisis.
The first consideration to note, therefore, is that a nuisance claimant must be realistic about 
possible limits on the range of remedies they can expect to obtain, if successful in establishing 
liability. Such realism appears to have shaped the handling of the case by counsel in Bodo 
People. Here the claimants reserved their position on the remedy of an injunction until after 
the trial on liability. As the case was settled, by what is believed to have been a monetary 
payment and commitment on the defendant’s part to clean up and restore the damage 
environment, no ruling on remedies was made. It would be unwise to speculate on a 
counterfactual scenario, except to mention that in principle, were an injunction to have been 
sought, the defendant would surely have been in a strong (if not unassailable) position to argue 
that an injunction ought to be withheld on grounds that policing an injunction awarded in 
respect of a foreign tort would raise serious issues of comity and exorbitant jurisdiction. 
These cautionary remarks presuppose that the remedy of damages is more straightforward, 
which to an extent it is. Awards for damages against defendants served as of right (present 
within the jurisdiction) or with assets within the jurisdiction can be enforced automatically. 
The enforcement of judgments of English Courts in member states to the Brussels  regime has 
166 The ƌegiŵe is ŵodelled oŶ the EŶglish Điǀil justiĐe sǇsteŵ: A. Baƌak, ͚“oŵe ‘efleĐtioŶs oŶ the Isƌaeli Legal 
“Ǉsteŵ aŶd Its JudiĐiaƌǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ϲ Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. 169. 
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been greatly simplified by the revision of the Brussels I Regulation.168 Not only has the 
exequatur procedure169 been eliminated, alongside the declaration of enforceability,170 but 
according to the new article 54, if the remedy granted by the judgement is unknown in the 
enforcing court this can be adapted to a similar, known measure. The ease of enforcement 
within the European Union territory may be of relevance to potential claimants that could seek 
to benefit from the flexible grounds of jurisdiction of the English court as they exercise the 
discretion implicit in the Spiliada test for service out of the jurisdiction on a foreign defendant 
knowing that, although the defendant hasn’t got assets in England to satisfy potential damages, 
the judgment could be enforced in any of the other state members to the Brussels system.171
If the defendant doesn’t have assets in England the claimant will need to apply to the (High) 
Court for a certified copy of the judgment,172 and present evidence of the original claim, service 
and, crucially, of whether the defendant objected or not, to the jurisdiction of the court and on 
which grounds.173 Enforcement in other jurisdictions outside the Brussels I Regulation174 scope 
will very much depend on the internal law of the country where the judgment is to be enforced 
and on the existence or not of reciprocal enforcement conventions between the UK and the 
country where the claimant seeks to enforce the English Court decision. Countries with which 
the UK has such agreements175 may enforce an English judgment by a simplified system of 
registration. But another note of caution: one of the impediments to registration or/and 
enforcement in the foreign jurisdiction may be the consideration that the English Court lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter.176  In cases where the English (High) Court has 
assumed jurisdiction in an extraterritorial nuisance case, one should wonder whether, 
paraphrasing Lord Ellenborough ‘the foreign court [would] submit to such assumed 
jurisdiction’177 and enforce the judgment. The answer to this is ‘probably not’. Attempts to 
make an English judgment against foreign defendants not present within the jurisdiction 
enforceable  by way of extending the territorial reach of an ex part order under CPR Part 71178
168 Israeli Class Action Law 5766-2006. 178 Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997) AC 655, 692
169 Exequatur is a private international law concept used in civil law systems referring to the decision of a court 
authorising the enforcement of a foreign judgment. 
170 As above, the declaration of enforceability authorises the enforcement of a foreign judgment within the 
court’s jurisdiction. 
171 It may also be one of the factors taken into account for the court as a potential advantage to one of the parties 
when exercising its discretion under the Spiliada rules, see  International Credit and Investment Company 
Overseas Ltd v Shaikh Kamal Adham [1999] 1 L. Pr 302, CA. 
172 CPR Rule 74.12 and Practice Direction 74A supporting Part 74. 
173 Rule 74.13. 
174 The enforcement of judgments under the revised (recast) Brussels I Regulation 1215/20102 has been 
streamlined further in the latest review of the Brussel’s regime.  A decision of a court of a Member State will be 
(almost) automatically enforced in the territory of any other member state. 
175 The Administration of Justice Act 1920 applies to Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand and Singapore while The 
Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 applies to judgements from Australia, Canada, India, 
Israel, Pakistan, Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Mann. 
176 The common law establishes that the English court will recognise a final and conclusive judgment of a court 
with ‘international jurisdiction.’ This jurisdiction is ‘jurisdiction in the eyes of the English court’; it is not 
enough that the foreign court had jurisdiction according to its own rules, as Lord Ellenborough stated in 
Buchanan v Rucker (1808) 9 East. 192 
177 Buchanan ibid. 
178For an explanation of the intention behind the order and potential enforcement consequences of the decision 
of the Court of Appeal see A. Briggs “Enforcing and Reinforcing an English Judgment” (2008) 4 Lloyds 
Maritime and Commercial law Quarterly, 421-7. 
22 
were rejected by the House of Lords in Masri v Consolidated Contractors.179 Their Lordships 
took a view against extending the extra-territorial reach of enforcement orders, sending perhaps 
a reminder to potential litigants that orders concerning enforcement are restricted to the place 
where assets are located and this factor should be taken into account by parties starting 
proceedings alongside jurisdiction and choice of law issues. 
The above black letter law remarks should be situated in a wider socio-legal context concerning 
the politics of private international law in a tort setting. In particular is the extent to which 
transnational tort actions can often serve symbolic rather than compensatory objectives.180 For 
example, in most of Alien Tort Statute actions pursued in the United States, it is understood 
that damages have not been collected.181 An explanation for this is that civil remedies are 
sought as a means ‘for providing a measure of self-respect, vindication and recognition for the 
victims rather than a mechanism of enforcement under international law.”182 That does not 
appear to have been the case in Bodo People, where the concern was with monetary 
compensation (out of which legal expenses would be paid). But one can easily imagine any 
claim in the setting of the Geshuri works, discussed above in section 4, having rights-
vindication as its priority, whether as a standalone remedy (a statement of wrongdoing by a 
respected court), or to unlock a settlement in which the works cleans up its process and respects 
the rights of its neighbours.  
6. Conclusion 
There are many reasons for seeking to litigate an industrial pollution tort claim beyond the so 
called natural or home forum, within the framework of private international law. In some cases 
the search for a different forum is led by the applicable law or the remedies available,183 whilst 
at other times considerations of access to justice are at play.184 Indeed, issues of substantive 
law and process are often interconnected and combine in the field of tort, to make this subject 
as dynamic as it is. In many cases the choice between different jurisdictions signifies a 
substantive law advantage to one party or the other.  Occasionally the stakes are considerably 
higher than securing an advantage for one of the parties, in that ‘what is being decided is 
whether litigation can proceed or not at all’. 185 In this respect it is not an exaggeration to say 
179 [2009] UKHL 43 
180 B. Stephens, J. Chomsky, P. Hoffman, J. Green  & M. Ratner (eds), International Human Rights Litigation in 
the U.S. Courts (2nd ed, Brill, 2008) ; R.B. Lillich, ‘Damages for gross violations of International Human Rights 
Law’ (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly, p 207, at p 208. 
181 Often due to practical reasons such of lack of funds within the jurisdiction and the difficulties of enforcement 
of the decision abroad, factors that we not known to the claimants at the time of starting the action. 
182 J. Terry, ‘Taking Filartiga on the Road’, in C. Scott (ed) Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the 
Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing, 2001), at p 112 
183 U. Baxi (ed) Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe; The Bhopal Case (The Indian Law Institute, 
1985). 
184In re Union Carbide Corp gas plant disaster 634 Supp 842 [1986], Connelly n 6; and Lubbe n 7.
185 D. W. Robertson and P.K. Speck, “Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum 
Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions”, (1990) 68 Texas law Review, p 937, at p 938  "Although courts and 
commentators routinely discuss forum non conveniens as if the issue at stake were a choice between two 
competing jurisdictions, in fact, the usual choice is between litigating in the United States or not at all”.
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that ‘t]he battle over where the litigation occurs is typically the hardest fought and most 
important issue in a transnational case.’186
Looking ahead to the longer term development of extra-territorial tort litigation within the 
framework of ‘private international environmental law’ in England and beyond, it is instructive 
to situate the discussion within the wider public international law governing neighbouring 
states. It is particularly important to think back to, and draw comparisons with, the famous 
Trail Smelter litigation.187 This case of state liability for transboundary harm started out life, 
before it became a concern of central government agencies, as a private nuisance dispute 
between farmers and a factory on respective sides of the US/British Columbia border. 
Historical research into the context of the litigation reveals that the interests of the original 
prospective plaintiffs were ultimately prejudiced by the transformation of the dispute from the 
private to the public international law sphere.188 In particular, the US government did not wish 
to push evidence against the Canadian factory that would be used against wealth generating 
polluting factories operating in US territory, whether by US pollution victims or Mexicans the 
other side of the US southern border.189 This reinforces the point that tort based solutions to 
environmental problems have deep roots historically, and that nuisance is above all attractive 
as an ‘unofficial’ means of addressing environmental problems – in the sense that by-passes 
executive bodies in favour of direct access to courts.190  This mirrors the trend towards bringing 
tort cases against corporations for human rights abuses alleging harm caused by ‘nuisance’ or 
‘negligence’ rather than, for example, torture or violation of the right to life.191
Bodo People and the on-going Shell nuisance litigation-Ogale and Bille- can be read, in this 
light, as an example of private international environmental law coming out of the shadow of 
its public international law counterpart, albeit in an arrangement that is complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive.  
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187 Trail Smelter Case (US/Can) 1905 3 RIAA (1941). 
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